Being wrong often is the only way to be right – especially when you’re dealing with complex systems.
This – in a nutshell – is the evolutionary organization thesis.
Premature optimization is a sin when it comes to building software and it’s the best way to stunt learning and growth in DAOs.
The atomic unit of a DAO isn’t people or projects – it’s small groups of people working together.
While there has been a push to atomize work through bounties and other ways of defining and compensating work, the fact remains: DAOs are groups of humans coordinating together to solve problems.
We see this through the emergence of workstreams, working groups, guilds, or whatever else you choose to call the small teams that make up almost every DAO.
In the past few decades, our trust in institutions has begun to erode:
Trust is the cornerstone of any organized society, from student clubs to governments. If we cannot be assured that our peers will follow the same rules we operate from, we hamper our ability to cooperate with one another.
And so we attempt to codify trust. We create charters and constitutions to set fundamental rules for the game. Laws help further elucidate the nuances of these rules and we employ physical and financial force to create a cost to not playing fair. In doing so, we create a strong system of assurances that you and I will respect the rules of the game through codification, cultural norms, and consequences.
Metagovernance has become an increasingly popular topic within the DAO ecosystem over the last several months. It is commonly defined as holding one DAO’s token in order to influence decisions in another DAO(s). The benefits of metagovernance are clear - DAO2DAO relationships are positive-sum incentive-alignment mechanisms that amplify the voices of individuals.
Some recent proof points of the swift maturation of metagovernance knowledge and practices include:
Written by Dan Wu (@itsdanwu)
Improving member participation in governance remains one of the hottest and most nuanced problems facing DAOs today. However, these are not new problems we are facing. Roy Lerner wrote ‘Blockchain Voter Apathy’ describing the barriers for effective governance and potential solutions for increasing voter participation over two years ago. Despite his plea for change, governance participation has made little to no meaningful progress.
The purpose of this piece is to provide a high level primer on the current state of governance and participation. Some topics explored include areas where governance is needed, analysis of on-chain voter participation, common issues with governance today, and recommendations on how to resolve some of these issues identified.
2021 has been one of the most interesting years so far for DAOs. As DAOooooors, it is important that we take proper time to look back, reflect and introspect. Maybe we missed out on an airdrop here and there, maybe we burned a bridge or two. But DAOs have shown us their unstoppable power to bring people together, who otherwise would never meet, to build innovative products and grow wholesome communities. We would like to shine light back on some of these memorable moments.
When not fantasizing about the next 1000x moonshot, many crypto-natives dream about how DAOs will transform the way people collaborate. DAOs are imagined as flat and fluid organizations, the opposite of the rigid, pyramid-like structures dominating the corporate world today—an organization where every stakeholder gets to speak their mind and be heard, whether you are a big whale or just a smol ting. It is a noble end-state to pursue, but the reality is that as DAOs grow, they tend to encounter certain pain points (many of which are brought on by their flatness) that hinder their progress.
This article will briefly look at the scaling problems that DAOs run into today, go over the problem with token voting and offer a high-level introduction to how Orca Protocol will solve this problem.
DAOs, decentralized autonomous organizations, have recently regained the attention of the crypto community. A new DAO seems to popup everyday—from collective NFT buyers to syndicate DAO frameworks. Not only has consumer excitement for DAOs exploded, organizations of different shapes and sizes are increasingly eager to begin their journey to decentralization.
Yet, throughout this DAO boom, there has been little clarity on what these new organizations really are. Formal definitions are a good place to start when things are new, but there does not seem to be one for DAO—even though many attempts have been made. What makes a DAO, a DAO? Why is it that we, as end-users, can so freely join and cooperate with new frens in the DAOs we love? And what could be useful tools for DAOs to optimize for cooperation and coordination?